Maryland Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 3

Article 7

Default Judgment on Scire Facias in Baltimore City
- O'Neill & Co., Inc. v. Schulze

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Default Judgment on Scire Facias in Baltimore City - O'Neill & Co., Inc. v. Schulze, 4 Md. L. Rev. 312 (1940)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol4/iss3/7

This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. IV

clusion of evidence at trial rather than by motion to suppress made in advance.
The Marianacase was uncontested on the point of the
right of the State to appeal. It would be interesting to
have a similar case which would be contested on the point
and to see how the Court would rule on a motion to dismiss the appeal. For to come out squarely in favor of
the right of the State to appeal in the Mariana case situation (or in that of the directed verdict of not guilty)
would be to leave but two alternatives. One would be
to create a difficult question of double jeopardy. The other
would be to allow the appeal, as a way of getting a declaratory ruling, without allowing a re-trial of defendant
after reversal. This latter would be foreign to our traditions in the matter.
And yet there seems no other device 25 for compelling
trial courts to follow the rule of the Sugarman case.
But to deny the right to appeal would be consonant with
the rule, applicable to other points, that trial courts have
the power (if not the right) to commit all the errors they
may wish if the errors are favorable to defendants.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON SCIRE FACIAS IN
BALTIMORE CITY
O'Neill & Co., Inc. v. Schulze1
Plaintiff-appellant obtained a judgment against defendant-appellee and fourteen years later caused a writ of
scire facias to be issued out of the Superior Court of Baltimore City to revive it. The writ was issued on June 27,
1938 and made returnable July 11. On the day of its issue the sheriff read it to defendant but did not leave a
copy of it. There was evidence that it had not been the
practice of the Superior Court to make copies of writs of
26 Did the common law writ of prohibition from a higher court to a
lower one prevail in Maryland, this would be one way of undoing such a
pre-trial error by a trial court. There Is apparently no authority for the
use of the writ In Maryland and, in fact, the Court of Appeals has decided
that it has no original jurisdiction in the course of holding unconstitutional a statute purporting to confer habeas corpus powers on it as a
Court, Sevinskey v. Wagus et ux, 76 Md. 335, 25 A. 468 (1892). In that
case, by dictum, it was also Indicated that mandamus powers could not
be conferred on nor exercised by the Court. By the same logic, the writ
of prohibition is not available, either.
2 7 A. (2d) 263 (Md. 1939).
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scire facias but that it had been the uniform practice of
the Baltimore City and Common Pleas Courts to furnish
the sheriff with a copy to be left with the defendant. Defendant failed to appear, so a judgment of fiat nisi was
entered, and, on August 8, the second return day after
service, a fiat executio was issued. On August 17, still
within the May term, defendant filed a petition (or motion) to strike out the original judgment, the sheriff's return on the scire facias, the judgment of fiat nisi, and the
fiat executio. The motion was granted except as to -the
original judgment, which was not disturbed.
On appeal, held: Reversed as to striking out the sheriff's return on the scire facias, but affirmed as to the rest.
Scire facias to revive a judgment is not an action but is a
judicial writ and thus is not within the Rule Day Act.
This opinion challenges attention for what it ignores
rather than for what it discusses. The substance of the
decision is an affirmance of the lower court's action in
striking out a judgment, which action was taken more
than thirty days after the same was entered, but still within what was known as the May term. This conclusion
was reached by construing the Baltimore City Speedy
Judgment or Rule Day Act.2 In order to understand fully
the legislative intent which gave rise to this statute, it is
necessary to read the act as an entirety.' Isolation of single sections of a comprehensive enactment may result in
a misinterpretation of its scope.
The first act relating to more speedy recovery in cases
arising in Baltimore City was passed in 1858 but was repealed in 18614 as a result of the disturbed condition of
the country. It was limited to certain types of contract
actions and provided for three terms, commencing on the
second Monday in January, May and September but added
the second Mondays in the other months as rule days. A
party instituting an action covered by this act had the
election of having service made returnable to the next
I Md.

Code Pub. Loc. L. (1930) Art. 4, Secs. 303-319.
'A note to Alexander v. Worthington, et al. 5 Md. 471, 473 (1854), in
the Perkins Edition, collects the cases as authority for this rule of statutory construction. Some of the more recent cases enunciating the same
principle are: Mitchell v. State, 115 Md. 360, 80 A. 1020 (1911) ; Foote v.
Stanley, 117 Md. 335, 82 A. 380 (1911) ; Crouse v. State, 130 Md. 364, 100
A. 361 (1917) ; Tilly v. Jones, 158 Md. 260, 148 A. 434 (1930) ; Darnall v.
Connor, 161 Md. 210, 155 A. 894 (1931) ; Baltimore v. Deegan, 163 Md. 234,
161 A. 282 (1932); Bickel v. Nice, 173 Md. 1, 192 A. 777 (1937).
' Md. Laws 1858, Ch. 323; repealed, Md. Laws 1861, Ch. 4. On the history in general see, 2 PoE, PLEADING AND PRACTIcE (Tiffany Ed. 1925) 385.
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succeeding term or to the next succeeding rule day. If
he elected to have it returned to one of the new rule days,
the same proceedings could be had in the prosecution of
it as would have been proper if it had been returnable
to one of the three terms. It was further provided that
if the defendant failed to appear on the day to which the
writ was made returnable, judgment by default could
be entered upon plaintiff's motion but if defendant appeared before the next rule day (or first day of the term
when the writ was returnable at the next term) the default judgment would be stricken out. Failure to appear
within this latter time subjected the defendant to the entering of a final judgment.
In 1864 the Act of 1858 was re-enacted 5 with some material changes as to the formal and procedural requirements of bringing suit under it but the types of cases to
which it applied were not increased. It stated that the
first day of each term and the second Monday in each of
the other nine months should be return days. The Court
of Appeals held' that a writ of scire facias to revive a
judgment was not an original writ within the meaning
of this statute and, since the language of the first act is
no broader in this respect, it may be assumed that such
writs were not within the meaning ,of that act either. It
is to be noted, however, that neither of the early enactments mentions scire facias writs specifically and that their
purpose was to accelerate
the adjudication of only a re7
stricted class of cases.
In 1886 the entire Act of 1864 was repealed and a new,
more comprehensive statute was passed, which is still the
Rule Day Act of Baltimore City.8 Some of its sections
have been amended and a few have been added but most
of them retain the exact wording of the Act of 1886.1 The
term Rule Day Act or Speedy Judgment Act is ordinarily
applied to the sections which provide ". . . an expeditious
method of reducing to judgment a valid and uncontested
claim in cases where the amount was certain and liqui5

Md. Laws 1864, Ch. 6.
Bridges and Woods v. Adams, 32 Md. 577 (1870).
7This act too was only optional. Ch. 6, Sec. 2 provided that: "Any
person instituting an action in any of said courts, may at his election have
his original wri made returnable to the next succeeding return day, or
the first day of the next succeeding term."
B Md. Code Pub. Loc. L. (1930)
Art. 4, Secs. 303-319.
Secs. 305, 312, 314, and 316 have been amended and Secs. 313A, 315,
315A, and 315B have been added, but none of these changes affect the question Involved here.
6
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dated . . .,,10 but actually that is only a part of the Act
of 1886 and the remainder is general in its scope." In the
principal case of O'Neill & Co., Inc. v. Schulze the Court
discusses only those sections which precede the provisions
for speedy judgments in liquidated contract cases. No
mention is made of the later sections which are also general in their nature and which appear to have a direct
bearing on the situation involved.
The opinion in the instant case holds that Sections 304
and 306 apply. Section 304 reads:
"All original writs, writs of execution, attachment,
replevin, ejectment, scire facias and habere facias, as
well as all other writs and process issued from or returnable to any of said courts, which under the practice heretofore existing would have been returnable
to the first day of the term, or to a return day, shall
hereafter be made returnable to the first return day
after the issue of the same, or may be made returnable to the second return day thereafter, if the party
by whose direction the same was issued, or his attorney, shall so request in writing."
Section 306 reads:
"After the execution of any writ or other process
made returnable to a return day in either of said
courts, the same proceedings may be had thereupon
as if the same had been made returnable, and had been
returned to a term of said court under the practice
heretofore existing, except as hereinafter otherwise
provided."
These provisions are interpreted to mean that the term
rule was not abolished by the Act of 1886 and the only
change, except in liquidated contract claims, was the addition of nine return days. Such an interpretation apparently does not fit in with anything in the Act, either expressly stated or by inference.
The Act begins by adding nine return days to those at
the beginning of each of the three terms and then provides
that:
10 Pittman, The Maryland Speedy Judgment Acts (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev.
305. This article contains an excellent discussion of that part of the Act
of 1886.
21 Md. Oode Pub. Loc. L. (1930) Art. 4. Sees. 303311 and 317-318 are general in application. Sees. 312-316 apply to liquidated contract claims only,
and See. 319 concerns appeals from Justices of the Peace.
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".... the words 'return day', wherever used in this
subdivision of this Article shall apply as well to the
first day of each
term as to the other return days herein
' 12
enumerated.
Such language can mean only one thing, i. e. that the distinction between return days and the first day of each
term has been obliterated. This section alone would seem
to express the intention of the legislature to do away with
the old term rule which greatly retarded the final adjudication of suits at law. That this is the correct analysis of
the statute does not depend on mere phraseology, however.
Two sections of the Act substitute a thirty day rule for the
term rule and the substitution is expressly made, not
merely inferred, from the language. Section 317 provides:
"Any action taken or order passed by any of said
courts in relation to any judgment rendered by it, if
taken or passed within thirty days after the entry of
such judgment, or upon a motion or application made
to it within said thirty days, shall have the same effect
and force as it would have had under the practice heretofore existing in said court if taken or passed during
the term, or upon a motion or application made during
the term at which said judgment was entered, and no
more; but any such action taken or order passed after
the expiration of thirty days from the entry. of any
judgment, (unless upon a motion or application made
within that time), shall have the same effect and force
as it would have had under such previous practice, if
taken or passed after the expiration of said term, and
no more; and the said courts shall respectively have,
for a period of thirty days after the doing of any act
or thing in any cause before them, the same revisory
power and control over such act or thing which, under
the practice heretofore existing, they would have had
over the same during the term at which it was done,
and no more; and after thirty days from the doing of
any such act or thing, the said courts shall have the
same revisory power and control thereover, which,
under such previous practice they would have had
after the expiration of the term at which said act or
thing was done, and no more."
12 Md. Code Pub. Loc. L. (1930) Art. 4, Sec. 303.
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And Section 318 reads:
"In all cases where the pre-existing laws direct or
require that any act or thing shall be done in or by
any of said courts during the same term at which some
other act or thing may be done or happen, such first
mentioned act or thing shall hereafter be done within
thirty days after the doing or happening of said last
mentioned act or thing."
That these provisions apply to all suits at law seems clear;
their terms leave room for no other interpretation.
Thus it appears that there are three general changes
which apply to all suits in the common law courts, including scire facias. First, service is returnable to the next
succeeding rule day or, at the plaintiff's election, to the
second return day after service and not to the first day of
the next term; second, any action or order subsequent to
the entering of a judgment must be taken within thirty
days instead of within the term; and third, any act which
formerly was required to be done within the same term
as another act must now be done within thirty days.
Clearly the Act applies to scire Jacias before trial and
after judgment so that to hold that the time for entering
judgment is governed by the former rules of practice appears to be completely inconsistent with the spirit of the
statute. There would be no advantage gained in an earlier
return of service if the case would not come up for trial
any sooner than it would have under the old rules. Obviously the legislature did not intend that the defendant to
a writ of scire facias should have an entire term to file his
pleadings but the losing party should have only thirty
days in which to present reasons why the court should
strike out or modify its judgment. There is no practical
benefit derived from the act unless all the provisions are
given effect.
The construction that the Court of Appeals has placed
on Section 306 is perfectly reasonable as far as the wording of that section alone is concerned but, as indicated
above, such an interpretation fails to fit in with the other
provisions. It is susceptible of another meaning, however,
which does away with any possible conflicts among the
various provisions. The language used by the General Assembly is capable of indicating that body's intention that
the four month term be abolished and that a one month
term be substituted for it. This is the construction which
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the courts of Baltimore City have placed upon it and their
ruling has received such universal acceptance that no case
has ever been argued in the Court of Appeals on this particular point. In practice, for the fifty-three years that
the statute has been in force, cases have been tried on the
assumption that the writ of scire facias is governed by
the Act. Even in the present case the point was not suggested. The contention of the defendant was that the
sheriff's return was void because no copy of the writ was
served as required by the Act and, as the Court pointed
out, the plaintiff invoked the Act in its motion for a judgment by default but sought to show that it did not require
service of a copy except when the suit was begun by filing
a declaration. Apparently the plaintiff conceded that the
Act applied to the time for entering the preliminary and
final judgments.
If the only suits affected by this decision were those
involving scire facias to revive a judgment there would be
little reason to deplore it. After a judgment is so old that
scire facias proceedings are necessary to keep it alive there
is usually no urgent reason for speed in obtaining a new
judgment. This is particularly true where the original
judgment has become stale through the running of the
Statute of Limitations. It is hard to imagine how any
injustice would result, in such cases, from slowing down
the judicial machinery. It is doubtful, however, whether
this ruling can be confined within such narrow limits.
The writer is informed that one of the lower courts in
Baltimore City has already applied it to a suit involving
an attachment on judgment. The Code section authorizing execution by way of attachment provides:
"Any plaintiff having a judgment or decree in any
court of law or equity in this State may, instead of
any other execution, issue an attachment . . . which
attachment shall contain the clause of scire facias
required in an attachment against a non-resident or
absconding debtor ... ",8
As must have been involved in the recent case in one of
the courts of Baltimore City, there is no distinction between a scire facias in an attachment and a scire facias
to revive a judgment. Speed is essential in attachment
sMd. Code (1924) Art. 9, Sec. 29. Construed in Manton v. Hoyt, 43 Md.
254 (1875) ; and Johnson v. Lemmon, 37 Md. 336 (1873). See also 2 Po,
PLEADING AND PR&cmImE (Tiffany Ed. 1925) See. 693.
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proceedings, but the doctrine of O'Neill & Co., Inc. v.
Schulze requires the passage of two terms (as much as
eight months) before judgment becomes final, instead of
sixty days, which was the practice from 1886 to July, 1939.
A consistent following of this decision will result in many
classes of suits being read out of the Act so that the entering of final judgments will be greatly retarded. The outcome is that the four month term rule is, at least partly
brought back to life, although this would appear to be
opposed to the intention of the General Assembly of 1886,
as well as to the practice which has prevailed for many
years. Some further action, legislative or judicial, to correct the result of the principal case would seem to be desirable.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF STATUTE IMPOSING
BURDENSOME TAX ON PARTICULAR KINDS
OF BUSINESS-CLASSIFICATION FOR
PURPOSES OF TAXATION
Brown v. State1
Appellant was indicted and convicted for selling ice
cream from a truck without having obtained the license
required by statute.2 On appeal he alleged that the license
fee exacted by the statute was unconstitutional, in that:
(1) The license law was, in effect, a police regulation and
the fees exacted were so large so as to be destructive of
business; (2) The act worked an arbitrary and unreasonable classification, which improperly discriminated against
those affected by it; and (3) The section requiring those
buying locally for sale outside the state to obtain a license
was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate buying here
according to the nature of the disposal of the goods outside
the state.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court and upheld the constitutionality of the statute in its application
A. (2d) 209 (Md. 1939).
Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 56, Sec. 26-30, providing that hawkers
and peddlers must obtain a license to "buy for sale out of the State, or
buy to trade, barter or sell, or offer to trade, barter or sell within the
State any goods, wares or merchandise . . . (there is an exemption as
to) hawkers and peddlers of oysters and fish In their unpreserved and
natural condition, or of fruits and vegetables perishable in their nature
that are sold in their natural conditions In this State". The amount of
the fees exacted varies; for peddlers using motor vehicles, like the appellant in the instant case, the fee is $300.00.
19
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